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ABSTRACT. The question of whether there are laws of nature in ecology has 
developed substantially in the last 20 years. Many have attempted to rehabilitate 
ecology’s lawlike status through establishing that ecology possesses laws that 
robustly appear across many different ecological systems. I argue that there is 
still something missing, which explains why so many have been skeptical of 
ecology’s lawlike status. Community ecology has struggled to establish what I call 
a General Unificatory Theory (GUT). The lack of a GUT causes problems for 
explanation as there are no guidelines for how to integrate the lower-level 
mathematical and causal models into a larger theory of how ecological 
assemblages are formed. I turn to a promising modern attempt to provide a 
unified higher-level explanation in ecology, presented by ecologist Mark Vellend, 
and advocate for philosophical engagement with its prospects for aiding 
ecological explanation. 
 
[T]he case for laws in ecology is generally thought to be weaker, since ecology 
lacks a grand, widely‐accepted, explanatory theory such as Darwinian evolution. 
—Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003, 651 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of whether there are laws of nature in ecology has developed substantially 
in the last 20 years (Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003; Ginzburg and Colyvan 2004; Lange 
2005; Linquist 2015). There is a new focus on the robust and resilient generalizations 
that ecological science produces (Linquist et al. 2016). This is a positive development, 
opening new avenues for identifying causal relations that can be implemented in 
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practical responses to the global environmental crisis. Despite these developments I 
contend that there is more to say on questions of whether there are ecological laws of 
nature. The flood of skepticism toward laws of nature in the 1990s was built around the 
failure of general theories that applied widely to community ecology (Lawton 1999; 
Peters 1991; Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993). It had become apparent that many of 
the top-down general theories of ecological composition rarely applied to actual 
ecological systems, which fueled skepticism toward ecology’s status as a science. This 
skepticism was coupled with a strong belief that local explanatory models and 
predictions were insightful. Nonetheless, the lack of general theory, I argue, still causes 
problems for explanation in ecology as there are no guidelines for how to integrate the 
local mathematical and causal models into a larger theory about the way ecological 
assemblages are formed.  
 This concern could be described through the language of Philip Kitcher’s 
unificationism (Kitcher 1981). Successful scientific theories, according to unificationists, 
have an argument pattern built from a schematic sentence, which can derive 
descriptions of many distinct empirical phenomena. The satisfaction of the unificationist 
urge to explain a large set of phenomena, in one type of schema, is part of the worry I 
am describing but not quite it. Unificationism is often coupled with a winner-take-all 
problem in which the most unificatory theory is the most explanatory (Woodward 2017). 
This I reject. The major developments in the philosophical literature on scientific 
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explanation over the last 20 years have been based around local explanatory models, be 
these interventionist causation, mechanisms, or models (Batterman and Rice 2014; 
Craver 2007; Weisberg 2013; Woodward 2005). All of these do not aim solely to unify a 
large number of phenomena but instead focus on, and trade between, other 
explanatory virtues including accuracy and precision. I contend that it is critical for a 
science to have both higher-level explanations, that are unificatory and general, and 
lower-level explanations, which are precise as they contain more detail in their 
description of the phenomena and predictive power.  
 Ecology lacks explanatory integration in the sense that there is no general and 
unificatory theory, a General Unificatory Theory (GUT). A GUT is general in that it can 
apply to many distinct actual systems but also unificatory in that it can apply to much of 
the sciences target explanandum, often in an imprecise way. These broad and slightly 
imprecise theories are critical as they provide a structure into which we can place lower-
level less unificatory theories. Lower-level theories explain details of the phenomena the 
GUT does not but remains silent on the larger system explained by the GUT. What I 
contend is that without a GUT, the science is impeded because the lower-level 
piecemeal theories are left as free-floating unrelated inferences, and there needs to be a 
higher-level comprehensive theory to guide how these theories relate.  
 Community ecology’s many, well-supported, but piecemeal explanatory models 
have been unable to be related through the framework provided by a GUT. The 
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relationship between ‘local’ model explanation and ‘global’ theories is described by 
Andrew Wayne as explanatory integration (Wayne 2018). Global theories have 
explanatory power independent from the local models as they unify phenomena and 
provide a schematic to derive predictions from initial conditions. These predictions are 
often highly idealized and difficult to implement to actual systems but provide a broad 
picture of the way different empirical phenomena relate within a science. Local theories 
are much more precise and implementable. They can describe actual instances of 
natural phenomena in detailed and predictively accurate ways.  
 Within Wayne’s terminology an explanation is either global or local. This 
distinction, however, does not fully capture the dimensionality of how laws apply, which 
is why I have altered my terminology to less elegant ‘lower-level’ and ‘GUT’. Laws can be 
general but not unificatory. General explanations apply to many different systems, 
despite changing local background conditions. Unificatory explanation, as I am using it, 
applies to the entirety of the sciences target explanadum; it acts to unify the different 
explanations of different parts of the target system. Think of the way natural selection 
provides explanatory power to so much of biological phenomena. In community 
ecology, the entire target system is the local ecological community, so our explanadum 
is the compositional identity of that community. Why do the species that exist in that 
community appear there and what causes their abundance? A unifying and general 
explanation is one that is explanatory for the entirety of local ecological communities, 
  
 5 
for many communities. It should provide some information about all the populations 
that appear within these local communities even if highly idealized. Given this 
conception of explanation, explanations for some feature, in many communities, is not a 
unifying explanation for community ecology.  
 If one is to agree with Wayne (2018), there is an important project of mapping the 
relationship between local theories, what I am calling lower-level theories, and the 
mutual supporting and organizing global theories (GUTs). This is done through a series 
of abstractions, idealizations, and counterfactual reasoning (p. 352). I will not address 
the details of this ‘mapping’ relationships project but wish to look at the issue of not 
having any suitable higher-level theory to organize and relate lower-level explanations. 
In ecology, we have many successful local theories, but we lack an organizing global 
theory of ecological composition—the distribution, identity, and abundance of species 
in a local ecological community—and this ultimately undermines ecology’s lawlike 
status.  
 I read the history of skepticism toward laws in ecology through this prism. The fear 
of ecology’s lawlessness was always focused around the lack of a unifying global theory 
that could explain ecological composition. In the following section, I turn to modern 
replies to the laws debate and show how they provide accurate lower-level explanations. 
Then in section 3, I attempt to characterize why lower-level ecological explanations are 
disunified and why this hinders explanation. Finally, I turn to a modern attempt to 
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provide a unified higher-level explanation in ecology and advocate for philosophical 
engagement in its prospects for aiding ecological explanation. 
 
2. INVARIANCE IN ECOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 
 
The laws of nature debates in ecology have largely focused on the role of invariance in 
explanations. A common interpretation of laws of nature has them exist as invariant and 
universal generalizations (Smart 1959; 1963). Anxiety about the existence of laws of 
nature has largely subsided through relaxing of the conditions under which a scientific 
generalization qualifies as a law, permitting laws which are not perfectly universal or 
invariant. Accordingly, ecology has found itself possessing laws through these relaxed 
standards (Cooper 1998; Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003; Lange 2005; Linquist et al. 2016). 
These relaxed standards, of what counts as a law, have been perceived as a reply to 
skeptics of general laws in ecology (e.g., Lawton 1999; Peters 1991; Shrader-Frechette 
and McCoy 1990, 1993). I pay attention to the work of Stefan Linquist (2015; Linquist et 
al. 2016), who has developed a comprehensive recent assessment of the prospect of 
laws in ecology. 
 Through the 1980s and 1990s there was a growing disillusionment with ecology’s 
ability to be a successful science. Some targeted ecology’s inability to make accurate 
predictions, leading them to describe it as a ‘soft science’ akin to sociology rather than 
the rest of biology (Peters 1991). Ecology’s lawlessness appeared particularly acute in 
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community ecology, where many practicing ecologists feared there were no lawlike 
generalizations (Brown 1995; Ricklefs 1987; Roughgarden 1989). Two exemplars of the 
skepticism toward ecological laws were John Lawton (1999), who argued against the 
existence of ‘general laws’ in ecology, and Kirsten Shrader-Frechette and Earl McCoy 
(1993), who argued that ‘top-down’ explanation, using general theories, fails in ecology 
and instead explanation should be built ‘bottom up’ from case studies. Both are 
skeptical of what I would consider GUTs of ecological communities, which aim to explain 
widely the demographic features of an ecological community in an area. Theories like 
niche theory, assemble rules, or the diversity stability hypothesis all aimed to describe 
broad demographic trends in a community. It is to these theories that skepticism toward 
laws was directed rather than local mathematical and causal laws, which both at times 
appear to affirm.1  
 In the years since there has been a defense of laws, stating that there are widely 
applicable laws in ecology even if they are not universal. Some interpret critics like John 
Lawton (1999) as requiring ecological laws have universal and invariant generalizations 
(e.g., Roughgarden 2009). Given this perspective no ecological law would qualify, and 
we should reasonably reject this high standard for law-hood. The responses developed 
 
1 For example: Shrader-Frechette and McCoy state “despite the problems with general ecological theory, 
there are numerous lower-level theories in ecology that provide reliable predictions” (1993, 120). Lawton 
states “contingency is manageable at a relatively simple level of ecological organisation (for example the 
population dynamics of single and small numbers of species)” (1999, 177). 
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to skeptics of laws in ecology have a firm basis in the philosophical literature. There is a 
long history, in philosophy of science, of arguing that laws of nature can be contingent, 
and exception ridden (Cartwright 1983). Accepting ecology as full of contingent ceteris 
paribis ridden laws was argued early. Greg Cooper (1998) held that in ecology, just as in 
the rest of biology, universality is not a reasonable standard to hold laws to. Instead law 
status should be derived from the range of different contexts the law holds over; the 
more contexts, the more law-like it is. This move was in line with several suggestions 
aiming to weaken the conditions under which a natural pattern qualifies as a law 
(Mitchell 2000; Skyrms 1980; Woodward 1997). Contingency was astutely treated as a 
quantity that came in degrees, rather than a binary presence. Degrees of contingency, 
the extent to which a phenomenon is robust to changes in background conditions, is of 
the utmost interest to science. This intellectual shift provided opportunities for ecology’s 
contingent generalities to become lawful. 
 It is within this space, of identifying degrees of invariance, that we find important 
replies to the earlier criticisms of the possibility of ecological laws. Linquist (2015) argues 
that ecology is rich with causal relations, which are invariant across a range of 
background conditions, and applies the conceptual apparatus of James Woodward 
(2005) to defend the existence of laws in ecology. Degrees of invariance can be 
explicated utilizing the work on causation and laws Woodward developed (1997; 2005). 
Causation is understood as a relationship between two variables X and Y, if there is a 
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systematic intervention on variable X to change its value and this results in a change in 
the value of variable Y, then Y causally depends on X. These causal relations are always 
within a context of background conditions (B). Water boils at 100° C in many different 
conditions, but in some conditions it doesn’t. For example, variation in the degree of air 
pressure or percentage of salt present can change the value of the target variable. A 
causal relation can be ‘stable’ or ‘contingent’ given the degree to which the causal 
dependency is found across a range of background conditions. 
 A similar defense of the existence of contingent laws can be found in Mark Colyvan 
and Lev Ginzburg, who, among others, argued there are imperfectly instantiated 
mathematical laws (Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003; Ginzburg and Colyvan 2004; Turchin 
2001).2 Lawton also accepts these as laws (1999, 177). Prime candidates of mathematical 
laws of ecology being the logistical growth of populations or allometries, like the Kleiber 
allometry, which states that an animal’s basal metabolic rate is ¾ of its body mass. 
These laws are mathematical and statistical generalizations that apply widely in nature. 
They are subject to contingency; changes in initial conditions can alter the presence of 
such patterns. For example, population growth is not logistical when there are 
disturbing factors (see Kingsland 1985 on the historical debates on population growth).  
 
2 A reviewer questions if such laws are laws of mathematics rather than laws of ecology. I do not make 
such divisions. The gas laws are laws of gasses as much as they are laws of mathematics. Causal laws are 
laws of the target variables as much as they are instantiations of the metaphysics of causation. Following 
Lange (2005), what makes a law a law of a particular science is the explanandum under consideration. 
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 Ecological laws appear to apply across multiple different system types, such as 
different habitats or temperatures. A law can be robust in the face of setting a 
background variable to different values or variation in the variable itself. The ability of a 
generalization to survive changes in the background variables is described by Linquist et 
al. 2016 as resilience and they describe three different categories of variation in 
background variables. They describe resilience in the face of variation in the species the 
generalization holds over (taxonomically resilient), variation in habitats (habitat resilient), 
and variation in the scale (spatially resilient)3. Then using meta-analyses of multiple 
ecological studies, they identify laws that have such resilient generalizations. They 
identified generalizations in community, ecosystem, and population ecology. These 
included: habitat fragmentation negatively affects pollination, herbivore removal 
increases primary producer biomass, and invasive species increase pools of stored 
nitrogen.  
 These generalizations are very different to the generalization of niche theory, 
assemble rules, or the stability-diversity hypothesis. They are significantly more 
constrained in their scope. The target variables are not area and species diversity, or 
 
3 I have found this description of resilience rather counterintuitive. For example, take the following 
generalization: warmer temperature increases species X predation success. The target variables are 
temperature and the predation success of a species. Both these variables take a range of values. Linquist 
et al.’s 2016 notion of resilience would have this resilient if it was generalizable over many species, but this 
is not a background condition, it is a change in the target variable. Resilience, as I would consider it, would 
involve varying not the temperature or species, the target variable, but other background conditions like 
the habitat type this taxon was present in to see whether the relationship held. But my focus here is on 
other issues rather than what variables are background conditions in causal explanation. 
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total resource consumption, which can then be used to describe the entire community 
species count or identity. Instead these variables are aimed at units of investigation like 
pollinators or invasive species, parts of the ecological community. These are crucial 
explanandum but are not the sort of variables act to describe broad features of a local 
community. These replies are correct in establishing there are resilient laws. Precise 
lower-level explanatory models in ecology are well supported and quite general in that 
they apply to many systems under a range of background conditions. But these resilient 
lower-level laws do not establish the presence of top-down GUTs in community ecology. 
 Many of the replies to ecology law skeptics have involved showing the range of 
conditions a generalization is maintained over, but this has not affirmed a role for 
general and unificatory theories about what determines the distribution and abundance 
of organisms in a community. Some may consider this an acceptable position for 
ecological science. We could have many different robust lower-level theories and 
models without a larger theory of ecological composition. In the next two sections, I 
turn to characterizing the problems with solely having lower-level generalizations and 
elaborate a promising recent attempt in the ecological literature to provide a GUT of 
ecological communities. 
 
2. GUT-LESS SCIENCE4 
 
4 Please do not interpret this as inflammatory. There was an opportunity for a pun, so I took it. 
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Local ecological communities have robust local causal structures that generalize across 
multiple instances. The contents of these ‘laws’ are, however, extremely disjunctive. They 
describe different kinds, patterns, and processes, rarely in ways that easily relate to the 
contents of other laws. The purpose of a general theory in a science is to structure the 
predictions of lower-level laws so that they can ultimately relate their predictions to 
each other. The robust generalizations need to speak to the larger scientific field they 
belong to. Without general theories, these lower-level explanations often only provide 
information about their local explanandum, and they struggle to inform explanandum 
which fall outside the local model. A general scientific theory informs how a local model 
relates to other explanadum across their science. 
 The disunity of lower-level laws can be observed from their drastically different 
variables (Vellend 2016). Consider two of the laws of nature identified by Linquist et al. 
(2016) for community ecology, “The removal of herbivores increases the biomass of 
primary producers” and “The impact of grazers on prey biomass decreases in proportion 
to species richness of prey communities” (Table 2, p. 11). The variables in just these two 
rules include a count of herbivores, a quantity biomass of primary producers, a quantity 
of prey biomass, a count of prey species types. Both biomass and counts of individuals 
are used. Generally, this is because defining individual organisms for many species, 
particularly plants, is extremely difficult so ecologists tend to use biomass for organic 
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types that they cannot easily individuate. As such, sets of organic types are bifurcated 
into continuous or discrete measures. Distinguishing organic types is extremely difficult 
in ecology. We have herbivores, prey, grazers, primary producers, and species. These 
different taxonomies for organic types include classical biological taxonomy, species, but 
also several different ways to carve up food chains and functional actions in a 
community. 
 While plenty of sciences involve many unique variables, for example chemistry 
involves a large number of individual chemicals, what differs in ecology is the lack of 
theory guiding the description of these variables. Chemical kinds have an explanatory 
framework by which they are divided, their atomic number. This acts to structure the 
inferences made about these different variables and combinations made from them. 
There is a GUT that structures the variables and provides a way to relate the variables. 
Ecological variables are built up from many unique local models and frameworks, which 
impede this ability to relate explanations in one lower-level theory to another. But how 
do GUT act to organize the inferences made through lower-level theories? 
 Prominent general theories in other sciences are evolutionary theory, the standard 
model of particle physics, or the general theory of relativity (Wayne 2018). All these 
theories act to structure the lower-level models within their respective sciences. Wayne 
(2018) uses the example of R. A. Fisher’s sex ratio model, which identifies an equilibrium 
dynamic resulting in a 1:1 sex ratio. This local model shows the sex ratio, like many 
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biological phenomena, is subject to stabilizing selection. Stabilizing selection can be 
taken as evidence for very different conclusions. The sex ratio model can be taken as 
evidence for creationism; many different changes to mating strategies will gravitate 
toward this stable ratio. As such, there is a preordained structure in nature, 1:1 ratio 
sexually reproducing species, which is resistant to changes. The impact of this model on 
the science of biology is much different when it is embedded in the theory of evolution. 
The meaning of the local model, the sex ratio model, to the scientific field, biology, is 
structured by the general theory, evolutionary theory.  
 Sex ratios will be robust across multiple different biological systems, it is a resilient 
feature across biology. Without the more general unificatory model of natural selection 
there is no indication of why this generalization holds in some cases and not others.5 
Exceptions exist to sex ratios and it is the larger theory of natural selection that provides 
us with the framework to understand why. When a lower-level model is embedded in a 
network of more general models we are given a guide to why the law applies. It is not 
enough to simply have a theory be robust in local instances, we want to know why it is 
robust under the background conditions it is. This is what general unification theories 
provide, guidance on when a model should apply to a target system. 
 
5 Thanks to Stefan Linquist for a helpful discussion on this point. 
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 Applying this to the case at hand, consider two laws as proposed by philosophers 
of ecology, Kleiber allometries, and “the impact of grazers on prey biomass decreases in 
proportion to species richness of prey communities” (Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003; 
Linquist et al. 2016). Kleiber allometries are found widely in nature but it remains 
extremely unclear as to why they hold. There is an explanatory gap, which if they were 
placed in a larger theory we would be in a much better epistemic position to answer. As 
of yet, they stand as a generalization without clear reason as to why they are general. 
This is similar to Kepler’s laws in astrophysics; they are extremely robust and widely 
found but it was unclear as to why they apply without a more unificatory law like 
Newtonian Gravity.6 Equally, “the impact of grazers on prey biomass decreases in 
proportion to species richness of prey communities” involves very specific sets of 
populations; why does this theory only apply to grazers and not carnivores or 
insectivores and why is the law-like relation quarantined to this set of causal variables 
and why not form a law-like relationship with the larger set of species that interact in 
this community? While we can hypothesize why this is the case, a more unificatory 
theory would provide clear guidance as to why rather than requiring much secondary 
hypothesizing.  
 
6 Thanks to Mark Colyvan for bringing up this analogy.  
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 The exemplar of a GUT in community ecology was niche theory (Elton 1927; 
Hutchinson 1957; Macarthur 1958; Macarthur and Levins 1967). Niche theory acted to 
integrate a whole large set of observations and generalizations into a single framework 
allowing for their comparison. Describing an organism’s niche involved providing a 
profile of the resources it used. In doing this, ecologists could identify resource overlaps 
and resources over which populations competed. Resource consumption could then be 
placed within a food web to identify which populations consumed each other and 
influenced the larger resource cycle. Ultimately, this connected both the biotic dynamics 
of food web and competition with abiotic resource cycling, providing a comprehensive 
picture of ecological communities. The focus on competition in niche theory allowed for 
ecological dynamics to be continuous with evolutionary theory, as competition is 
considered a major driver of adaptive variation. Niche theory was an elegant global 
theory, which comprehensively explained ecological phenomena at the local community 
level and the role of community ecology in the biological sciences. Due to its 
comprehensiveness, the lower-level models of ecology could be incorporated into the 
niche theory framework. With niche theory losing its centrality to ecology through the 
1980s and 1990s there was a lack of organizing grand theories in ecology (but see 
Chase and Leibold 2003 for a defense of niche theory).  
 The failure of the GUTs proposed in ecology, particularly niche theory, had and has 
a real impact on ecology. Global theories provide an explanatory blueprint for how the 
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lower-level variables are related. Without this explanatory structure we are faced with a 
series of problems, which I now elaborate. First, there is the Tower of Babel problem. 
There is an immense set of redundant, and worse, partially redundant variables 
described in scientific laws. The partial co-descriptive nature of these variables causes 
problems for when we try to represent their causal influence on each other, this I 
describe as the (Partial) Partitioning of Causes problem. The third issue I want to raise is 
the possibility there is no way we can translate the tangle of variables to each other, that 
some variables in ecology are Incommensurable. All these issues result from having no 
general framework from which to relate the different variables in ecology.  
 
3.1 TOWER OF BABEL 
 
The Tower of Babel problem is well known by ecologists (e.g., Grimm and Wissel 1997; 
Herrando-Pérez et al. 2012). It is where the terminology used to describe ecological 
phenomena is so inflated and inconsistent it is difficult to parse the relationships of the 
concepts and scientific variables used in ecological research. This may not seem 
significant to some philosophers, as they might conclude that there is still some ideal 
way for these terms to be related if we are given time to find it, but it is immensely 
impactful to practicing scientists (Trombley and Cottenie 2019). I explain why 
terminological convergence and variable consistency aids scientific progress. 
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Consistency is often a forced byproduct of having to relate each lower-level theory to 
the general theory that subsumes them.  
 For each of the important variables in ecology we find a proliferation of similarly 
referring terms. Terms such as ‘ecological community’, ‘ecological function’, ‘invasive 
species’, ‘biodiversity’, and ‘niche’ all have a wide range of interpretations through the 
science. In an extended consideration of the concept density-dependency, Herrando-
Pérez et al. (2012) identify several different manners in which the lexicon is 
counterproductively inflated.7 Term inflation can include synonymy, where two words 
refer to the same thing. For example, the observation that increasing population size 
results in the slowing of population growth has been referred to as ‘centripetality’, 
‘compensation’, and ‘disoperation’. Such a problem can be addressed by convention, if 
we can bring all parties into agreement. A more difficult issue is when terms differ 
slightly but not substantially. This can be due to differing interpretations of the 
theoretical justification of the terms meaning or the revision of the term so that it 
includes more phenomena the researcher considers explanatorily important. This results 
in multiple terms that partially co-refer. Partial co-reference yields problems in 
partitioning causal influence, as discussed below, but beyond that it leads to 
considerable confusion about what phenomena has been explained. A general theory, 
 
7 The ideas in this paper are expanded and clarified in the following blog post by the coauthor Corey 
Bradshaw. https://conservationbytes.com/2012/09/17/ecology-tower-babel/ (accessed February 8, 2019). 
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which each of these terms need to be related, allows for a common language that new 
variables must be coherent with and allows for consistent meaning across a science.  
 Inconsistent and difficult to parse terminology holds back the education of the next 
generation of ecologists. When students and early career researcher try to understand 
concepts, concepts that experts reasonably disagree on, the lack of clarity puts a barrier 
to understanding the difficult theoretical terms that populate the science. This does not 
just impede the speed at which experts can be trained; some within the field may avoid 
research which deploy such byzantine terminology. This in the long term will influence 
the scope of ecological research and can drive the turn to studying individual 
populations, or narrow research domains, rather than broader more theoretical 
hypotheses. This is a different type of problem than what are usually considered by 
philosophers. The lack of unifying explanations is creating a practical problem: it 
prevents scientists from identifying a framework that can aid in organizing the 
terminology. Instead convergence is case by case and requires difficult negotiations 
between relevant scientific parties as they lack a common worldview. The science 
through a lack of an epistemic resource, a unifying framework for their target 
phenomena, is practically impeded.  
 
3.2 (PARTIAL) PARTITIONING OF CAUSES 
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The differing local theoretical frameworks can result in many sets of variables, which 
extensionally overlap or partially overlap. When we want to relate these local laws, or 
models, we need to identify how the variables in each law causally or constitutionally 
relate to each other. The process of identifying these relations can be extremely difficult. 
Decisions must be made about what general framework is used to relate all these 
differing lower-level theories. A general theory of ecological communities would provide 
a series of variables which lower-level theories would relate to creating a common 
causal and constitutional framework. I believe that there is a real problem with just 
building a science from the ground up without any consistency in the variables used.  
 The importance of variable consistency can be seen when we incorporate ceteris 
paribus conditions or integrate different laws on a single target phenomenon. Colyvan 
and Ginzburg (2003) describe the Galilean law of freefall, in which large bodies all fall at 
constant acceleration irrespective of their mass. This is a well-established law of physics, 
but it has well-known exceptions. Snowflakes have radically different rates of 
acceleration than hailstones. This is due to the ceteris paribus condition of friction, 
which is derived from Newtonian mechanics. When these two laws are integrated, to 
explain the difference between the phenomena of snowflakes and hailstones falling, we 
need to identify their differential effect on the target phenomena, the acceleration of 
these bodies. Both laws can have their causal influence partitioned in their effect on 
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single target variable. This is required for integrating causal relations derived from 
separate laws.  
 The partial co-reference of variables to the same system results in problems when 
we attempt to integrate different laws. Local laws, which display causal relationships 
between variables, will eventually need to be related to each other to gain a 
comprehensive picture of how ecological systems are arranged and maintained. We 
need to identify whether the local laws just redescribe the same phenomena (and the 
relationship between variables) in different local laws. When different laws describe 
variables that partially refer to the same referent we will have a problem when we 
amalgamate the causal information contained in these laws. For example, Law X 
describes the conditional relationship A causes B, Law Y describes the relationship C 
causes B*, where B and B* partially refer to each other. When we want to unify the 
science, we need to decide what the dependent variable is in the natural system we 
want to explain, B or B*. When settling on either variable, or a third compromise 
variable, there will be difficulty in identifying how much A and C influence the 
dependent variable due to the partial reference. It may require a whole new set of 
research to identify the relationship between these variables, slowing down progress 
and impeding our ability to infer the impact of lower-level laws on each other. These 
impacts could act as background conditions for other laws, which explain why certain 
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laws have the general domain they do. As such, having the ability to identify the 
network of causal interactions between local laws is crucial for scientific understanding.  
 
3.3 INCOMMENSURABILITY 
 
The distinct carving of ecological variables might be untroubling, in the ideal, if these 
variables could be translated from one variable set to another. This would involve 
finding systematic correlated relationships between the values in one variable 
description and another. Translation between variable sets is, however, not possible if 
variable sets are incommensurable. In such cases there is no systematic way to translate 
the variables found in one theoretic description to another. For example, there is a clear 
relationship between the measures of an imperial measurement 12-inch ruler and a 
metric 30-cm ruler but there is not a systematic relationship between the values of an 
imperial measurement 12-inch ruler and the Schmit sting pain index. The 
incommensurability between the Schmit sting pain index and a classroom ruler is 
acceptable because both apply to very different representational aims; one is to 
measure distance, the other the pain inflicted by insect (Hymenoptera) stings. 
Community ecology suffers from a lack of commensurability internal to its own field, to 
features with similar representational goals. This causes problems for integrating lower-
level laws in ecology as the variables in one model, or local law may not be able to be 
translated into the other. 
  
 23 
 The problems I am describing in community ecology have been previously ascribed 
to a narrower domain of microbial ecology by Inkpen et al. (2017). They focus on the 
problem of functional measures in microbial ecology and argue there is no systematic 
way to distinguish functional types in an ecological setting. This fear about functional 
measures has been voiced in macroecology with Mlambo (2014, 781) stating loose 
definitions of function result “in an unfortunate view of functional diversity as a 
combination of any available morphological, physiological and life-history traits.” This 
ultimately makes function incommensurable with taxonomic variables (often measured 
through phylogenetic diversity) as what counts as a function is highly disjunctive. This 
coheres with a growing body of literature, which show a lack of a clear relationship 
between these measures (Devictor et al. 2010; Mazel et al. 2018). There can be 
correlations, but these will be partial and interestingly asymmetrical; taxonomy may 
predict function while function is inaccurate at predicting taxonomy. I would, however, 
restrict this worry to functional measures that describe morphological or physiological 
traits rather than function in the sense of cycling a type of resource. Resource cycling is 
a more multiply realizable trait and can appear in many more varied contexts, and this 
allows it to avoid incommensurability with other traits.  
 Incommensurability between phylogeny and morphological function matters 
because both the measures have similar representational aims, describing the diversity 
of populations in an ecological setting. Functional measures are generally local to 
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limited sets of species, rather than the majority of life, and functional measures are 
highly disjunctive, sharing little in common, so there can be no consistent relationship 
between function and taxonomy. The disjunctive nature of function through life explains 
the incommensurability between it and phylogeny. Some critics have argued against 
using phylogenetic measures of diversity because they do not accurately correlate with 
function, and function connects better to ecosystem service (Winter, Devictor, and 
Schweiger 2013). Other argue the wider representational scope of phylogenetic measure 
makes them preferable as a general measure of diversity (Lean 2017). Both sides aim for 
a convergence on key measures of diversity to integrate the ecological research being 
produced and aid conservation practice. Given the lack of consistent translation 
between function and taxonomy, be it species taxonomy or phylogenetic relations, these 
measures are incommensurable along the entire set values these variable sets take. 
There cannot be a single set of bridging laws that explains the relationship between 
these two measures. 
 Incommensurability can result from having variables uniquely individuated by 
many different scientists and different conceptual schemas. Invasive species are alleged 
to be examples of this. The category is famously underdetermined with no consistent 
usage; what counts as an invasive species from one study to another can differ widely 
(Rejmánek et al. 2002). There seems to be no clear biological properties underlying 
‘invasive species’ which would allow for a translation of invasive species to some sort of 
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functional biological variable (Sagoff 2005). Incommensurability, as a result, pervades 
community ecology and extrapolating from one study design to another varies from 
extremely difficult to near impossible.  
 This all comes to a head in attempting to explain an ecological community’s 
composition, what explains the current distribution and abundance of populations. To 
explain a community, we need to partition up the unique causal influences that affect 
the community into discrete causes that can account for all the variation. We need to 
know why certain resilient laws appear to be robust over some background conditions 
and not others. A cacophony of non-discretely partitioned and incommensurable 
variables cannot be adequate for explanation. For a complete theory we need a general 
account of ecological arrangement, in which the variables can be partitioned so the 
lower-level laws can be related. This would allow for a consistent science of ecological 
communities, which can allow for studies across the science to be relatable.  
 
4. A RECENT PROPOSAL 
 
General Unificatory Theories never left ecology after the panic over whether ecology 
possessed laws of nature. A recent development is Mark Vellend’s description of 
community ecology being governed by four higher-level processes in his book The 
Theory of Ecological Communities (2016). He defends the need for a general and 
coherent picture of ecological communities. This theory uses a general description of 
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ecological community phenomena that is consistent in its variables, economical, and 
largely complete. This is not to say that it is correct, there is a way to go to establish 
that, and I think there remains significant problems with Vellend’s proposal. However, 
this theory is a major development and an exemplar of how a general theory organizes 
the local models and causal inferences, with disparate variables, into a single framework. 
This aim, to unify lower-level theories into a single general theory, is also explicitly 
Vellend’s aim.  
 In a series of papers and later a book Vellend argues that community ecology can 
be viewed as analogous to population genetics (Vellend 2010; 2016; Vellend and Orrock 
2009). Both sciences aim to explain patterns of distribution and abundance. In 
population genetics it is the arrangement of genetic characters in a population, while in 
ecology it is the arrangement of organism types in a community. Population genetics 
explains the arrangement of genetic characters in a population through the higher-level 
processes of selection within species, drift, gene flow, and mutation. These processes are 
not described by single causal structures or mathematical pattern. They are explained 
through many lower-level causal relations and represented by families of mathematic 
models. But they are unified at the higher level through general processes that describe 
how varietals move in a population. 
 The theory of ecological communities posits ecological communities are arranged 
by the following forces: selection among species, drift, dispersal, and speciation. These 
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are analogues of the four central processes in population genetics—selection within 
species, drift, gene flow, and mutation. Whereas the target variables of population 
genetics are the change in allele types, the target variables of community ecology are 
the change in species types. The selection between species has been well studied and 
much of what was historically described as ‘traditional community ecology’ by authors 
including Lawton focused nearly entirely on selective forces between species types 
(Brown 1995; Lawton 1999). Speciation involves the production of new species varieties, 
just as mutation produces new varietals in genetics. Macroecologists have emphasized 
the influence of speciation of local community organization (Brown 1995; Ricklefs 1987). 
Drift incorporates the stochastic aspect of birth, death, and mating; as such, this theory 
includes probabilistic influences on the arrangement of species. The final process is 
dispersal, which accounts for how species move across a landscape, which is heavily 
influenced by metacommunity structure and the scale of the community.  
 This framework is aimed to be comprehensive, with Vellend stating “despite the 
overwhelmingly large number of mechanisms thought to underpin patterns in 
ecological communities, all such mechanisms involve only four distinct kinds of 
processes: selection, drift, speciation, and dispersal” (Vellend 2010, 183). Through 
maintaining a single set of target variables, the distribution of organisms as typed 
through species, and having an exclusive set of forces, Vellend provides a general and 
unificatory theory. The target variables of lower-level laws should be translated into 
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these higher-level forces to create a unified science. All ecological communities have 
their composition determined by different degrees of these forces. This theory is both 
economical, and hopefully explanatorily complete, avoiding the pitfalls of having 
numerous laws without a clear sense of their relationship. 
 Vellend explicitly describes his theory as an attempt to unify local community 
phenomena under a set of higher-level processes. To show how this theory unifies 
community ecology under higher-level processes Vellend utilizes Elliot Sober’s (1991; 
2000) discussion of natural selection. Sober argues that natural selection buys its 
generality through abstracting away all the causes of fitness differences. These causes 
can be explained by lower-level laws. Instead, it is a theory of the consequences of 
fitness differences. This act of abstraction unites the different causes that contribute to 
fitness and provides an explanatory schematic that applies across biology. Vellend aims 
to do likewise, focusing on the distribution and abundance of organism types that are 
the product of ecological processes.  
 This act of abstraction removes the messiness Vellend, and I, contends exists in 
ecological theory. He argues current ecological theory is a laundry list of patterns, lower-
level processes, higher-level processes, and the numerous different ecological kinds. By 
creating a general explanatory schema, built around higher-level processes, he aims to 
unite the many lower-level generalizations into a single framework. This provides an 
explanatory schema and structures the observations and inferences we make about 
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communities. The invariant generalizations described by both Colyvan and Ginzburg 
(2003) and Linquist et al. (2016) can be described within this framework as lower-level 
processes, which contribute to the higher-level processes described by Vellend (2016). 
For example, the lower-level law, “the impact of grazers on prey biomass decreases in 
proportion to species richness of prey communities,” is incorporated into the higher-
level processes of ecological selection (Linquist et al. 2016). 
 Describing selection as just one of the four processes involved in community 
ecology laws helps explain the problems with Lawton’s (1999) view of community laws. 
He was just too narrow in what should count as a law in community ecology, relegating 
too much variation to background conditions. When Lawton describes community 
ecology, he only counts local populations and their interactions as being in the scope of 
community ecology, not metacommunity dynamics such as migration between 
communities, which are treated as background conditions. One way to interpret the 
failure of local community ecology is there are few robust local relationships given 
variation in the metacommunity dynamics. All these other factors are included within 
the Vellend framework. 
 Now I am not defending the ‘theory of community ecology’ as being correct. There 
will be difficulty implementing these four axes. Other grand theories like Thomas 
Schoener’s (1986), which had 12 axes in a n-dimensional hyperspace to explain 
community assemblage, could not be implemented due the complexity and contingency 
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of the different axes (Lawton 1999). Some believe ecology’s causal heterogeneity means 
that general laws cannot ever be found (Elliott-Graves 2018).  
 Another worry is that the expanandum of ‘the science’ is not worthy of general 
unifying theories. The domain of a unifying explanation is partially derived from the 
epistemic aims of a science. As I described earlier a unifying explanation for community 
ecology would have explanatory power for the entirety of an ecological community. 
There could be the possibility that explanation in community ecology is a problem 
because ecological communities do not exist (Ricklefs 2008; Shrader-Frechette and 
McCoy 1994, 110). If true one could interpret the fracturing of the science into 
piecemeal explanation which don’t easily relate is the explication of the science into 
more apt sciences as they have better defined target systems. This style of argument has 
some force which needs to be mitigated and I have defended the explanatory value of 
ecological communities previously (Lean 2018).  
 But such issues, among others, do not diminish the interesting contribution to 
ecological theory, and laws of nature, presented by Vellend (2016). He provides a 
comprehensive and explicit attempt to unify lower-level ecological laws into a general 
higher-level explanatory framework, which deserves further consideration. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
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The science of community ecology lacks explanatory integration. The variables and laws 
described in the many different local laws do not easily integrate with the other local 
laws. This is because ecological variables are inconsistent and incommensurable. 
Without a higher-level theory to organize the lower-level explanations we will struggle 
to provide comprehensive explanations of ecological phenomena. Some ecologists, 
particularly Mark Vellend, realize this and are actively attempting to address these issues 
by presenting a general theory of ecological communities (Vellend 2016). Philosophers 
should pay attention to these developments as they provide insight into scientific 
explanation and the historical debates around laws in ecology. 
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